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	<title>UK SCAMS &#187; Store Cards</title>
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		<title>Store Cards</title>
		<link>http://ukscams.co.uk/store-cards/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Sep 2006 19:29:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Alun Hill MCIJ</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Store Cards]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Shoppers are being overcharged Â£100m a year as a result  of inflated interest rates on retail store cards, the UK&#8217;s competition watchdog  has said. 
The Competition Commission said there was evidence that the  store card market was uncompetitive, with interest rates up to 20% higher than  they should be. 
Full Report:
The [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><font size="3"><strong>Shoppers are being overcharged Â£100m a year as a result  of inflated interest rates on retail store cards, the UK&#8217;s competition watchdog  has said.</strong> </font></p>
<p><font size="3">The Competition Commission said there was evidence that the  store card market was uncompetitive, with interest rates up to 20% higher than  they should be. </font></p>
<p><strong><em><font size="3">Full Report:</font></em></strong></p>
<p><font size="3">The Competition Commission (CC) has provisionally concluded that  there is an adverse effect on competition in connection with the supply of  consumer credit through store cards and associated insurance in the UK. It has  estimated that in broad terms, store card APRs are on average some 10 to 20 per  cent higher across the store card market as a whole than they would have been  had they reflected providers&#8217; costs, including the cost of capital. The  detriment to cardholders in terms of the excess prices paid for credit and  insurance is in the region of Â£80 million to Â£100 million a year. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">CC Deputy Chairman Christopher Clarke, who is chairing the  inquiry, said: </font></p>
<p><font size="3">We have provisionally concluded that there are features of the  store card market that effectively insulate retailers and consumer credit  providers from competitive pressures, notably from credit cards and store  branded credit cards. There is therefore little competitive pressure either on  APRs or insurance. Retailers&#8217; primary concern is to avoid having an APR on their  store card which is above those of other store cards. At the same time,  consumers&#8217; sensitivity to APR levels and other charges is low. Taken together,  this results in store cardholders who take up credit, and associated insurance,  paying more than they would in a fully competitive market. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">Potentially significant changes in the store card market are  underway, maybe to some extent as a result of this inquiry. Almost immediately  before we finalized our provisional findings, one major provider told us of  further initiatives to lower APRs. However, we do not expect that in the next 12  to 24 months or so, these will be sufficient to remedy the adverse effect on  competition. We must therefore now look to put in place measures that will bring  about greater competition in this important market. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">The CC concluded there are two relevant economic markets: an  &#8216;upstream&#8217; market, where providers compete for retailers&#8217; store card contracts;  and a &#8216;downstream&#8217; market for the supply of credit and insurance through store  cards to retailers&#8217; customers. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">In contrast to the downstream market, the CC concluded that the  upstream market was competitive and displayed no features that prevent, restrict  or distort competition. In particular, it found that there were no discernible  barriers to entry into the market by financial institutions with an established  reputation and the requisite in-house or outsourced capacity. While it  identified some remaining hurdles for providers aiming to tender for an existing  contract on its expiry, relating to informational asymmetries and the hand-over  of portfolios, it decided that these could be surmounted and had been  successfully cleared in many cases. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">It found that there had been a shift in the balance of  negotiating power from the store card providers to the retailers, but that the  additional benefits they had gained were not being passed on to consumers.<br />
The CC identified some 70 retailers operating store card services-mostly  department stores and clothing retailers-mainly provided by six store card  issuers: Arg Card Services, Creation Financial Services, General Electric  Consumer Finance UK (GECF), HSBC Group, Ikano Financial Services and Style  Financial Services. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">At the end of 2004, there were almost 14 million active store  card accounts, with outstanding balances of about Â£2,500 million. As at  mid-August 2005, most store card programmes had APRs clustered around 30 per  cent and the CC found that there was little competitive pressure on them.  However, the CC found that there were a few retailers which had store card  programmes with APRs significantly below that level and that providers were  prepared to accommodate requests for such programmes when contracts come up for  re-tender. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">The CC found that some 57 per cent of store cardholders who used  their card in a particular month took on interest-bearing credit. The remaining  43 per cent settled their balance in full and did not incur interest changes.  The CC noted that most of those who generally incured interest on their accounts  also had access to other sources of credit.<br />
Although the numbers of active  accounts have been declining, the CC considered that store cards would continue  to be important for some time to come-for retailers as one of their marketing  tools and for the providers of store cards as a route to market for their  financial products. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">The CC&#8217;s investigation, which is based on data relating to the  period from 1999 to 2003, (supplemented by later information for 2004 and 2005),  has focused on the functioning of the market as a whole rather than on the  conduct of individual companies. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">Provisional findings<br />
After careful consideration of the  large amount of evidence from retailers, store card providers, government  bodies, consumer organizations and trade associations, as well as the data  gathered by consumer surveys, the CC has provisionally found that there is a  combination of features which prevent, restrict or distort competition in the  markets for the supply of consumer credit through store cards and associated  insurance: </font></p>
<p><font size="3">(a) providers and retailers structure the store card offer in  such a way that many store cardholders take out such cards to obtain the retail  benefits they offer rather than the credit available on them;<br />
(b) most  retailers offering store cards do not exert competitive pressure on APRs;<br />
(c) most retailers&#8217; customers do not exert competitive pressure on store  card APRs (either at the take up stage or when they take credit) because their  sensitivity to them is low;<br />
(d) most retailers offering store cards do not  exert competitive pressure on the level of, or the provider&#8217;s policy in relation  to, the levying of late payment fees;<br />
(e) most retailers&#8217; customers do not  exert competitive pressure on the level of late payment fees levied on store  cards;<br />
(f) many store card credit providers combine different insurance  products into packages (that is, payment protection insurance offered with  purchase and/or price protection insurance) which they sell in association with  store cards;<br />
(g) most retailers offering store cards do not exert  competitive pressure on providers to lower their insurance premiums to  cardholders, or to offer the components of PPI separately;<br />
(h) most  retailers&#8217; customers do not exert competitive pressure on store card insurance  premiums because their sensitivity to the price of store card insurance cover is  low and they have a poor understanding of the terms of the cover they are  purchasing; and<br />
(i) most store card credit providers do not provide adequate  information on customers&#8217; monthly statements about APRs, late payment fees or  insurance charges or how these contribute to the current and ongoing costs of  revolving credit on their store cards. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">Remedies<br />
In the light of these provisional findings, the CC  has identified in its remedies notice (also published today) the measures it is  currently considering as possible remedies for the adverse effect on competition  it has identified and the consequent detrimental effects on customers. It is  inviting comments on the following possible remedies: </font></p>
<p><font size="3">(a) Full information on statements-measures to ensure that all  store card customers are consistently well placed to take informed decisions  regarding use of store card credit and the extent of their store-card related  insurance. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">(b) APR warning notice on store card statements-to ensure that  all store card customers are consistently well placed to take informed decisions  regarding use of store card credit and to give retailers an incentive to  negotiate lower APRs with providers in order to avoid any adverse reputational  effects of a warning notice. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">(c) Provide and prominently display facility to pay outstanding  balances by direct debit-measures which aim to reduce the proportion of  cardholders revolving credit inadvertently or through inertia as a result of a  lack of awareness of APRs and payment terms. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">(d) Separate offer of payment, purchase and price protection  insurance-measures which aim to provide greater choice for customers in  selecting insurance products to match their needs and which would enable them to  compare each element of the insurance package with competitor offerings. And a  requirement that, if providers offer &#8216;packages&#8217; of two or more elements of  payment, purchase and price protection insurance, they should offer each element  separately. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">The provisional findings report and Remedies Notice are  available on the CC web site: </font></p>
<p><a href="http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/current/storecard/index.htm"><font size="3">http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/</font></a></p>
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